| 1  | COURT OF APPEALS   |
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| 2  | STATE OF NEW YORK  |
| 3  | DOVANNE DELGADO  |
| 4  | ROXANNE DELGADO,   |
| 5  | Appellant,   |
| 6  | -against-<br>NO. 83  |
| 7  | STATE OF NEW YORK,   |
|    | Respondent.  |
| 9  | 20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor October 18, 202                               |
| 10 | Before:  |
| 11 | ACTING CHIEF JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO   |
| 12 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA               |
| 13 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS              |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN   |
| 15 | Appearances:   |
| 16 | CAMERON J. MACDONALD, ESQ.   |
| 17 | GOVERNMENT JUSTICE CENTER, INC. Attorney for Appellant                       |
| 18 | 30 South Pearl Street, Suite 1210<br>Albany, NY 12207                        |
| 19 | VICTOR PALADINO, ESQ.  |
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| 22 |  |
| 23 |  |
| 24 |  |
| 25 | Karen Schiffmille<br>Official Court Transcribe                               |



ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: The first case on 1 2 today's calendar is number 83, Delgado v. State of New 3 York. 4 Counsel? 5 MR. MACDONALD: Your Honor, if I could reserve 6 two minutes for rebuttal? 7 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Two minutes. 8 MR. MACDONALD: May it please the court, I'm 9 going to get right to the point of this matter, with the 10 unconstitutionality of the 2018 law that created the 11 committee on legislative and executive compensation and a 12 matter that I believe is first - - - a matter of first 13 impression for this court, which was the enabling language 14 of that law that permitted an unelected committee to make, 15 what was called, recommendations. 16 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: What do you mean 17 when you say, it's a matter of first impression, given we 18 have the judicial accountability litigation? 19 MR. MACDONALD: For this - - -20 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: For this court. 2.1 MR. MACDONALD: This court, the Court of Appeals. 2.2 So what the - - - functionally, what the law did was it 23 took some recommendations by an unelected committee that

action of the legislature, and - -

became law, as of January 1st, 2019, without any further

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| JUDGE RIVERA: But why do you need that action?              |
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| I mean, you've got the original statute. The legislature    |
| has already made a determination, has provided these        |
| factors, has given guidance, and then the legislature does  |
| have an opportunity to reject those recommendations. So     |
| you've got legislative action on the front end, legislative |
| action on the back end. It sounds like more legislative     |
| action than you would have had if you were just passing a   |
| statute.  |
| MR MACDONALD. Except that's not true, because               |

MR. MACDONALD: Except that's not true, because whatever the committee did, these recommendations they did, in addition to having what's called the force of law, also superseded inconsistent provisions of the Legislative Law, Section 5, 5-A, and 169.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but my point is that the legislature, because they get an opportunity to reject it, right, the - - - why - - - why isn't that - - - if not - - - if not the spirit within the language of the Constitution?

MR. MACDONALD: Sure, because - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't that good enough?

MR. MACDONALD: Yeah, because the Constitution has language and specific stuff for how a bill becomes a law, and within the spirit of the Constitution, isn't enough. So what you're talking about, Your Honor, I

believe, is, if anything what happened was the 2018 Act was a bill that had future action to be done, at what I, in our - - what we in our brief call a nonfinal bill, which is not something that the legislature is allowed to pass under the State Constitution.

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JUDGE WILSON: So can I probe - - - over here, sorry. Can I probe the contours of your argument a little bit? So supposed that things were set up the same way that it's set up, but what happens is the legislature says, for 2019, the compensation will be 110,000 dollars, and the committee for the successive three - - - each of the successive three years will adjust it based on inflation, let's say. Is that constitutional or not constitutional?

JUDGE WILSON: Okay. And what if it says, based upon the consumer price index? Still now constitutional?

MR. MACDONALD: Not constitutional because - - -

MR. MACDONALD: That's a good question.

JUDGE WILSON: I try to ask them.

MR. MACDONALD: Fortunately - - - fortunately, for me, that's not the case here.

JUDGE WILSON: Yeah, but I'd like to know - - 
I'm trying to see where the delegation comes from. Is it a

lack of specificity and if you get to some point where it's

specific enough, there's not a problem? Or is it from

something else?

| 1  | MR. MACDONALD: So, it's all of the above. First            |
|----|--|
| 2  | of all, it's the mechanism. The mechanism was one by which |
| 3  | the the committee did made its recommendations             |
| 4  |  |
| 5  | JUDGE WILSON: Let's stick with let's stick                 |
| 6  | with my good question.                                     |
| 7  | MR. MACDONALD: Okay. I'm getting to your good              |
| 8  | question.  |
| 9  | JUDGE WILSON: Okay.  |
| 10 | MR. MACDONALD: It was self-executing. So let's             |
| 11 | say there was a cost-of-living allowance built in there.   |
| 12 | Maybe that's self-executing enough that it passes          |
| 13 | constitutional muster, that there can be increases to pay  |
| 14 | during the legislative term. That's a possibility.         |
| 15 | JUDGE WILSON: Well, you don't say it said the              |
| 16 | CPI, right? Is that sufficient enough?                     |
| 17 | MR. MACDONALD: Yeah, and that would be great if            |
| 18 | it was our facts.  |
| 19 | JUDGE WILSON: Okay, but there are there                    |
| 20 | are several different CPIs, right? There's for urban       |
| 21 | there's there's a whole bunch of them. And beyond          |
| 22 | that, the CPI is created by a federal government           |
| 23 | organization, right, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which |
| 24 | sometimes changes the inputs to the CPI and sometimes      |

changes the weights to the CPI, so ultimately, you're

|    | naving a delegation to some nonelected group               |
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| 2  | MR. MACDONALD: So assuming that all                        |
| 3  | assuming that all works, I think that would be a situation |
| 4  | where we're skipping a step to what was actually the       |
| 5  | assignment of this committee. But if that were the         |
| 6  | if those were the guidelines, then you're getting into the |
| 7  | kind of what's wort what's not really being                |
| 8  | questioned here, the cases that establish Levine v.        |
| 9  | Whalen and so on that establish. Okay, you set up the      |
| 10 | guiderails   |
| 11 | JUDGE WILSON: So it's not the nonelected so                |
| 12 | much; it's the specificity is not tight enough. Is that    |
| 13 | the problem?   |
| 14 | MR. MACDONALD: Yes   |
| 15 | JUDGE WILSON: Okay.  |
| 16 | MR. MACDONALD: if you can get past the                     |
| 17 | fact that this committee is doing is is making             |
| 18 | recommendations that supersede existing law                |
| 19 | ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: So is                        |
| 20 | MR. MACDONALD: without the legislature                     |
| 21 | taking any further steps.                                  |
| 22 | ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: your                         |
| 23 | argument that the "reasonable safeguards and standards"    |
| 24 | that were included in the 2018 legislation were not        |
| 25 | specific or comprehensive enough?                          |

| 1  | MR. MACDONALD: My argument is that there were               |
|----|---|
| 2  | essentially none. There was a nonexistent, nonexhaustive    |
| 3  | list of factors that the committee could decide to use as   |
| 4  | appropriate to think about the prevailing adequacy of       |
| 5  | compensation of executive officers and legislators and      |
| 6  | statewide elected officials and then determine whether they |
| 7  | warranted there was an increase in those salaries           |
| 8  | that was warranted. That's the whole policy question.       |
| 9  | That's the  |
| 10 | JUDGE GARCIA: But Counsel                                   |
| 11 | MR. MACDONALD: whole ball of wax.                           |
| 12 | JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, it seems to what                     |
| 13 | I'm struggling with a bit is this case doesn't really fit   |
| 14 | within our separation of powers jurisprudence, right, which |
| 15 | is legislature delegates an overbroad policy decision to ar |
| 16 | executive branch, official, or agency. That's not what      |

MR. MACDONALD: It was supposed to be the Chief Judge, who declined to serve. I'm not sure why. I don't know if I - - - I know why. The 52nd State Controller and maybe the 24th City Controller - - -

happened here, right. So who's on this committee?

JUDGE GARCIA: So it was specific individuals - -

MR. MACDONALD:  $\ \ ---$  and then the sitting city and state controllers.



JUDGE GARCIA: Right. But in their individual capacities, right? The 52nd controller is not a - - - is not a controller; it's a specific person, right?

MR. MACDONALD: Yes. Yeah.

JUDGE GARCIA: So my issue seems - - - it seems to me the issue that jumps out to me is can the legislature delegate to this type of committee, which is not an executive branch committee or agency, this type of authority?

MR. MACDONALD: I say no. I think - - - JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah.

MR. MACDONALD: - - - they can create legislation that has commissions that do certain things that fit into

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MR. MACDONALD: - - - they can create legislation that has commissions that do certain things that fit into the body of administrative law that - - - that sits out there. My point - - - the point of this case is, this isn't within that body of law.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: So what is the rule? Since you acknowledge that commissions can be delegated with authority, we have case law that sort of defines the standards for how you delegate authority to commission, what is the rule to be applied in this case that shows us that this was an overstep?

MR. MACDONALD: So under the existent body of law, administrative agencies or commissions can develop rules and regulations that have the force of law. That



1 force of law is under the law. There's an existing 2 They're within the scope of that statute. 3 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: But we have that 4 here. There's an existing 2018 enactment that creates - -5 6 MR. MACDONALD: Right. 7 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - the 8 commission and gives it its marching orders. 9 MR. MACDONALD: Sure. But then those rules and 10 regulations don't supersede any other laws. They're - - -11 they stay within the bounds of that law. 12 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But here, there was a statute in 13 effect for them to be paid - - - for these particular 14 officers to be paid. The only thing that the committee was 15 to consider was the amount. 16 MR. MACDONALD: That's correct. 17 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So how is that doing something 18 impermissible? 19 MR. MACDONALD: Because what they did in that 20 instance - - - let's go with the executive - - - the 2.1 commissioners. They took six tiers, made them four; gave 22 the governor a discretion in one or two of the tiers that 23 didn't exist before. What they did, though, was that - - -24 what they did then supersedes existing law. So this 25

committee went and did these recommendations, that you

1 actually can't find anywhere very easily, and they are now 2 the law. 3 So on the books, anywhere you look, Westlaw, the 4 Legislative Information Service, the Senate website, 5 Casetext, anywhere online, Executive Law 169-E has - - -169 - - - has six tiers of commissioners still. That's not 6 7 been changed, even though this purports to have changed the 8 law, superseded the law. They're outside of the bounds of 9 what is typical - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: Well - - -11 MR. MACDONALD: - - - administrative law. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - Counsel, you would, I think, 13 even with your analysis, agree, that if what the 14 legislature had done was adopt a statute that set up this 15 committee and required that it provide recommendations, 16 both to salary and - - - and actually these other choices 17 that the - - - that the committee made - - - and then the 18 legislature adopted them, you would not object to that 19 process, right? Or rejected them? You would not object to 20 that process, correct? 2.1 MR. MACDONALD: I wouldn't - - - no, I mean, they 2.2 - - - they've had four years to do it. They could - - -23 they could moot this lawsuit today, and I'd be happy.



Yeah.

MR. MACDONALD: And my clients would be happy

JUDGE RIVERA:

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with that.

JUDGE RIVERA: So your point is that instead of having a system by which, if they don't act, the legislature doesn't act, the recommendation has the force and effect of law. But what you want is for them to affirmatively vote up or down, whichever way they're going to vote on it. Or well, vote up, right? They could just not vote on it, and that means it's not in effect.

MR. MACDONALD: Yeah.

JUDGE RIVERA: That is where the rubber meets the road, right - - -

MR. MACDONALD: Yeah, but - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - is your argument?

MR. MACDONALD: I guess I'm going to go out on a limb a little bit here and correct you when you say "force and effect of law" because  $-\ -\ -$ 

JUDGE RIVERA: Go ahead.

MR. MACDONALD: - - - my friend here is going to cop - - - keep talking about force of law. What they did was law. According to the law, it supersedes conflicting provisions of laws.

JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, what I'm asking you - - - along the lines of - - - some members of the court have given hypotheticals. I say, you wouldn't - - - would you agree that if the statute simply set up the committee,



| 1  | authorized it to provide the legislature with these     |
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| 2  | recommendations, and then the legislature had, at that  |
| 3  | point, to act, you would say that's fine, correct? They |
| 4  | can pass enabling statutes to design                    |
| 5  | MR. MACDONALD: Yes, Your Honor.                         |
| 6  | JUDGE RIVERA: whatever body to give them                |
| 7  | recommendations and do what they want.                  |
| 8  | MR. MACDONALD: That's correct, Your Honor.              |
| 9  | JUDGE RIVERA: So your issue is not setting up           |
| 10 | the committee. Your issue is that they don't then take  |
| 11 | some affirmative act                                    |
| 12 | MR. MACDONALD: Correct.                                 |
| 13 | JUDGE RIVERA: in response to the                        |
| 14 | recommendation.   |
| 15 | MR. MACDONALD: It's the executing mechanisms.           |
| 16 | JUDGE RIVERA: Right.                                    |
| 17 | MR. MACDONALD: So                                       |
| 18 | JUDGE RIVERA: So then the case boils down to            |
| 19 | whether or not the legislature can set up a mechanism   |
| 20 | where, if they don't act, it has the force of law.      |
| 21 | MR. MACDONALD: And I say they can't, and the            |
| 22 | Constitution says they can't.                           |
| 23 | JUDGE RIVERA: Because they always must act;             |
| 24 | that's your view?                                       |
| 25 | MR. MACDONALD: That's yes. And don't                    |



forget, I don't really think the governor should be able to prospectively surrender the governor's veto power, which is also an important part of our - - -

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ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel - - - MR. MACDONALD: - - - Constitutional process.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - with respect to both supersession and the veto, the original 2018 bill, legislation, contained the supersession language right in it. They - - it was certainly contemplated in the minds of the people who passed the bill that these numbers would supersede the numbers in the old statute. And one would presume, when the governor signed the bill, he noticed at the time that there was no veto provision in there. So how is this not all precleared under the statute?

MR. MACDONALD: Because it can't be. Because the way the statute is designed, that makes it a nonfinal bill. And the legislature can't pass nonfinal bills. They essentially left blanks to be filled in. We want - - we want you to decide - - - and they de - - - they gave an entire policy decision to this committee - - - decide whether or not everybody should get raises or not. Make that decision for us, and then fill in the blanks, and whatever blanks you fill in are going to supersede the existing law, where the numbers are already written down.

JUDGE RIVERA: No, it's actually - - - then we're



| 1  | going to look at it. You're going to give us the            |
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| 2  | recommendation, we're going to look at it, and we're going  |
| 3  | to decide whether or not we disagree, and if we do, we're   |
| 4  | going to reject it.   |
| 5  | MR. MACDONALD: Yeah, so or we're going to do                |
| 6  | nothing, and it's   |
| 7  | JUDGE RIVERA: That's actually what the way                  |
| 8  | the law is written.   |
| 9  | MR. MACDONALD: Right, or we're going to do                  |
| 10 | nothing, and it's going to self-execute and become          |
| 11 | JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, yes.                                    |
| 12 | MR. MACDONALD: become law. So to                            |
| 13 | back to, Judge Rivera, your back to your original           |
| 14 | question, this happened subsequently.                       |
| 15 | JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.                                       |
| 16 | MR. MACDONALD: I've participated in the campaign            |
| 17 | a public campaign finance case, Hurley, in Niagara          |
| 18 | County. That judge said, no, correctly, there's not         |
| 19 | there needs to be legislative equivalency for you to change |
| 20 | the election law. There wasn't. He struck down the          |
| 21 | statute. And weeks later, the legislature took basically    |
| 22 | everything that the that committee had done                 |
| 23 | JUDGE TROUTMAN: But in the Niagara County case -            |
| 24 |   |
|    |   |



MR. MACDONALD: - - - and passed it into law.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - that the committee was given the authority to commit - - - to create new law at - - - fully create new law, and it didn't have the parameters that were set forth here.

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MR. MACDONALD: They had quite a few rules that they were supposed to follow in what they were doing, I believe, in that.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So you're saying this case is identical to Niagara County case?

MR. MACDONALD: I'm not saying it's identical, because there was - - - because there was an extra component. They were tasked with drafting new legislation and - - and were given the power for anything that they did that conflicted with existing election law, it would supersede. I do believe that language was basically the same in both.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And still, because of the distinction between the two, it doesn't make a difference here. This - - - what this committee did, you say, still caused the legislature to improperly give up their powers.

MR. MACDONALD: That's correct. I would say that maybe the Public Campaign Finance Law was this one on steroids, because they got to, you know, draft new laws, as opposed to just supersede. But nevertheless, what happened was exactly what should have happened. A committee made



| 1  | some recommendations. The legislature actually enacted the  |
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| 2  | law. Regardless of anybody's position on the merits of      |
| 3  | that, that's the way it should be done, and that's the way  |
| 4  | this should have been done                                  |
| 5  | ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel                       |
| 6  | MR. MACDONALD: all the way through. Thank                   |
| 7  | you.  |
| 8  | MR. PALADINO: Good afternoon, Your Honors. My               |
| 9  | opposing counsel's major point seems to be that the         |
| 10 | committee is somehow superseding preexisting statutes. But  |
| 11 | as the Chief Judge pointed out, it was not the committee    |
| 12 | that did the superseding; it was Section 4(2) of the        |
| 13 | Enabling Act that superseded the preexisting statutes.      |
| 14 | JUDGE WILSON: Let me ask you a different                    |
| 15 | sorry.  |
| 16 | JUDGE SINGAS: Mr. Paladino, why not just apply              |
| 17 | the definition for a law that's in the Constitution? A      |
| 18 | bill passed by both houses and signed by the governor.      |
| 19 | MR. PALADINO: That precisely describes the                  |
| 20 | Enabling Act. It was the Enabling Act that was passed by    |
| 21 | both houses of the legislature and signed                   |
| 22 | JUDGE SINGAS: So then they have free reign? So              |
| 23 | as long as you comply with Boreali on any topic, if there's |
| 24 | an Enabling Act that allows it, anything is a go?           |
| 25 | MR. PALADINO: No, Your Honor. You have to                   |

MR. PALADINO: No, Your Honor. You have to

satisfy the requirements in Levine v. Whalen, all of which are satisfied here. We have the articulation of the basic policy, namely that salaries for public officials should be adequate.

That's - - - you're giving it to an executive branch agency. I mean, you have to retain the big policy picture in the legislature. But let me give you a hypothetical.

There's a legislature they wanted to do tort reform. It's getting to the end of an election year. They can't get around to it. There's a gubernatorial election; all the seats are up. They lose the gubernatorial election. The parties are going to change. Different parties coming in. Different governor. Not going to do tort reform.

They do this. They pass a law in the interim, and they offboard the process; they give it to a committee. The com - - - and say, same thing, you can overturn rules of common law, whatever you want, and if we don't act, we the legislature don't act, then that's going to become law and supersede statute.

So they do that. They come up with this thing.

It comes back. Bam, it's the law. There's a new governor sitting there powerless. Right?

MR. PALADINO: Well, I assume that this law that you're hypothesizing does set forth adequate policy - - -

| 1  | JUDGE GARCIA: Sure.   |
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| 2  | MR. PALADINO: all of adequate standards -                   |
| 3  |   |
| 4  | JUDGE GARCIA: That that offboarded                          |
| 5  | that offshore legislative machine there, that has the same  |
| 6  | authority you have here. Different topic.                   |
| 7  | MR. PALADINO: I think that would be a lawful                |
| 8  | delegation. If the governor if the governor who             |
| 9  | signed the law remained was politically accountable         |
| 10 | for signing that law. The new                               |
| 11 | JUDGE GARCIA: He's gone. He or she is gone.                 |
| 12 | MR. PALADINO: The new governor                              |
| 13 | JUDGE GARCIA: New governor. New governor says,              |
| 14 | where you know, you're overturning statutes that are        |
| 15 | passed on the books. Where's my veto? One house below.      |
| 16 | You can say, no, no, this is going to have the force of law |
| 17 | now, and there's no process that that there's no            |
| 18 | process for reviewing that by the executive branch.         |
| 19 | MR. PALADINO: Governors get overridden all the              |
| 20 | time. Bills become law over their veto.                     |
| 21 | JUDGE GARCIA: But that's the process that we                |
| 22 | have in the Constitution. This is not.                      |
| 23 | MR. PALADINO: Yes, it is, Your Honor, because if            |
| 24 | this new governor doesn't like the new state of affairs,    |
| 25 | that governor can can propose legislation to overturn       |

what this committee in your hypothetical did.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But - - - but that's maybe a fix to a problem, but my concern is the problem that's been created by having a process for changing the law that doesn't have to go through the Constitutional bill passing. You know, and we talk about commissions and other things, but those have to - - as I think your adversary was saying, one, they don't have the - - - they have the force of law, but they were overwritten by statute, and two, I think even the commissions have to comply with the Administrative Procedures Act, which I don't think this committee did.

MR. PALADINO: Well, my opponent did raise this SAPA claim. He lost in that claim, and he abandoned it, so that issue is not - - -  $\!\!\!$ 

JUDGE GARCIA: I'm not saying that's the claim you're going to win or lose on, but it just shows you how different this is from the ordinary process. I mean, they don't have to comply with SAPA, right?

MR. PALADINO: Well, Your Honor, they do have to follow the guidelines that were laid down for them. They have to act consistently with their enabling legislation. This is not unprecedented. This is just like Center for Judicial Accountability. It's just like the Berger Commission statute.



JUDGE WILSON: Well - - - well, it's a little different from Berger, isn't it? Because in Berger, the governor had the ability to disapprove it, no?

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MR. PALADINO: No, Your Honor. The - - - there was a legislative veto, a very questionable legislative veto process, by which the legislature could have disapproved the recommendations of the Berger Commission. That was doubtful in light of Chadha, assuming this court would follow the federal model in that respect.

What is similar is that there was enabling legislation that established the policy, established the guidelines, and reserved the right for the legislature to review the report of the committee before it became law, and pass a new law to modify or abrogate. But in other - - all other respects, it's essentially identical.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, it's not an administrative rule. I mean, there is - - - there are several differences. Not an administrative rule, right, in the truest sense of an administrative rule. This committee comes up with recommendations that will become law, unless the legislature rejects it, right?

MR. PALADINO: Well, I don't see much of a functional difference between this and a rule of an administrative agency, other than the fact that rather than having an ongoing administration - - -



JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the legislature - - - well, you're right. If a statute says that any administrative rule or particular administrative rule is going to go through this same kind of legislative thumbs up or thumbs down, but generally that's not the case, right? You have an enabling statute, authorizes the administrative agency to pass appropriate rules with appropriate guidance given to them, and they do, right?

MR. PALADINO: Exactly, and rules do not have to

MR. PALADINO: Exactly, and rules do not have to be submitted - - -  $\!\!\!\!$ 

JUDGE RIVERA: Without come - - - but I'm saying, but usually without coming back to the legislature. That's - - - that's what's happened here.

MR. PALADINO: That's true, but - - -

and although I think the hypothetical Judge Garcia has posed presents a tremendous obstacle to you, I guess there is a difference between the legislature delegating an entire subject area of law versus something discrete like the amount of the pay. Because the pay, they're entitled to a salary; that's constitutional. They're - - - they're not deciding whether or not you get paid, right? They're deciding the amount.

MR. PALADINO: Well, that's right. I think in - in Judge Garcia's hypothetical, the scrutiny might be



greater because of this - - - the scope of the delegation is so much greater. The - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Well, it sounds very much like early federal laws that knock down exactly that kind of legislation, where you were delegating an entire area, no matter how much you tried to narrow it, an entire area of law, versus this, which is - - - we're just talking about the amount of money you're paid. You've already made a decision, right? He has the constitutional entitlement to a salary. You've already - - - you're just deciding what's the number. I mean, I think the problem is that you've decided upfront that you're going to let them decide the number, and then once you see the number, you'll decide whether or not to reject it. That's his argument, that no, the only way this works is the legislature has to decide on the number first. It's not that someone can recommend it and then they just reject it. So legislature's got to decide that number.

JUDGE GARCIA: But this wasn't just a number, right? It was - - - they changed the tiers, right?

MR. PALADINO: Well, that's right, but what - - - think about what the tiers did. The tiers - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: No, no, but I'm saying, where would we draw the line? So would we say, you can offboard your legislative authority - - - and this isn't a



separation of powers. I think a lot of what we're mixing and matching here is, I'm giving my legislative authority to an executive agency. We have case law on that. Very different. That's not what happened here.

You're giving your legislative authority to this group. And they're going to come back, and you're going to pass it through a means that's not the regular bill passing. So if you're saying, okay, you can do a number, what more than the number can you do? You can do a number, plus if you need to change the tiers to get to the number, you can do the tiers. What else could you do?

MR. PALADINO: Well, the scope of the delegation is going to be important. And your example with the tort reform, obviously, there's a tremendous number of policies that are implicated there. You would presumably engage in more exacting scrutiny of the adequacy of the - - - of the policy articulation and the standards.

DUDGE GARCIA: Policy articulation to me is executive branch. We keep the policy; we give the rule-making authority to the executive branch. We have cases that look at that. Here, to me, is something very different. It's the authority to make law and how that law is going to be - - have the force of law. So you've delegated that authority to this committee, in a way, with parameters around it, but then within that, this thing

comes back, and unless both houses agree that they don't 1 2 want to do this, it has the effect of law, and it 3 supersedes within the realm of the delegation. 4 Where do we draw the line on when the legislature 5 can offshore that role? 6 MR. PALADINO: Well, there can be constitutional 7 restrictions on delegations. For example, in Article XI of 8 the Constitution, there are express limits on the 9 legislature's authority to delegate the taxing power. It -10 11 JUDGE GARCIA: So absent that kind of expressive 12 limitation, they can do this, as long as the delegation 13 kind of lists a relatively narrow area. 14 MR. PALADINO: Presumably yes. I mean, this 15 court, at least to date, has not adopted what's, I guess, 16 being worked on at the federal level, this notion of the 17 major questions doctrine, or it's too big a deal doctrine -18 19 JUDGE WILSON: So - - - so to follow - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Again, that's an executive delegation. That - - - those cases didn't involve congress setting up some type of other authority that then would come back. The only thing I can think of as an analogy is the rule-making authority, like the federal criminal rules, the rules of evidence, which have this type of enabling



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| 1  | act, but I believe the Supreme Court has said the           |
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| 2  | legitimacy of that is somehow tied to the the               |
| 3  | independence of the judiciary, and these are internal,      |
| 4  | inherent authority rules related to the judiciary. This i   |
| 5  | very different, right, so. This is                          |
| 6  | MR. PALADINO: The same exact mechanism was                  |
| 7  | approved at the federal level in the Pressler case, where   |
| 8  | the executive made a recommendation that acquired the force |
| 9  | of law unless overruled by congress.                        |
| 10 | JUDGE RIVERA: Does does                                     |
| 11 | MR. PALADINO: And I would point out that we                 |
| 12 | don't have a unitary executive. So the fact that I          |
| 13 | think that this is in the executive branch. It is doing a   |
| 14 | implementation. And under article Section 18 of             |
| 15 | Article III, the legislature is expressly allowed to creat  |
| 16 | commissions for special purposes.                           |
| 17 | JUDGE WILSON: Why do you say this is within the             |
| 18 | executive branch?   |
| 19 | MR. PALADINO: Because it's implementing rather              |
| 20 | than creating policy.                                       |
| 21 | JUDGE GARCIA: What control of                               |
| 22 | JUDGE RIVERA: I I don't see that. Aren't                    |
| 23 | they just choosing? They're just choosing. Because          |
| 24 | MR. PALADINO: The the                                       |
| 25 | JUDGE RIVERA: Do vou agree that the legislature             |

| 1  | could have made every one of the choices that's in the     |
|----|--|
| 2  | recommendation itself? Without any recommendations, they   |
| 3  | could have debated it amongst themselves?                  |
| 4  | MR. PALADINO: Of course, but                               |
| 5  | JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Do you                                 |
| 6  | MR. PALADINO: a valid delegation doesn't                   |
| 7  | depend on a court thinking that the legislature had a good |
| 8  | enough reason to do the delegation. It's a question        |
| 9  | JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let me ask you this. Do -              |
| 10 | - is there   |
| 11 | MR. PALADINO: of authority, not wisdom.                    |
| 12 | JUDGE RIVERA: Is there any is there                        |
| 13 | anything for us to draw from the fact that the language,   |
| 14 | the constitutional language, is to be fixed by law as      |
| 15 | opposed to be fixed by statute? Does that matter at all?   |
| 16 | MR. PALADINO: Well, my opponent thinks it                  |
| 17 | matters  |
| 18 | JUDGE RIVERA: Help you, hurt you, or doesn't               |
| 19 | matter.  |
| 20 | MR. PALADINO: but he's wrong. I mean, it                   |
| 21 | is true I agree with my opponent that 1948                 |
| 22 | JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I'm just saying. It could              |
| 23 | have said statute. And the only people who pass a statute  |
| 24 | are the legislate the elected officials in the             |
|    |  |



legislature.

MR. PALADINO: Right. The Constitution could have been worded in a such a manner as to pre - - - preclude a delegation, but it was not. It - - - the intent of it was to transfer authority from the Constitution, where salaries used to be - - - or legislative salaries used to be fixed, and give them to the legislative branch with the consent of the governor. But what's lacking is any evidence that that was intended to preclude the legislature from delegating that authority, just like it can delegate just about any other authority, as long as you have - - -

general term case, so we're going way back to 1871, Healey v. Dudley. That case held that - - indulge me for a minute - - that "the Constitution, in providing that the salaries of county judges shall be established by law, confines the power of fixing such salaries to the legislature." The court further reasoned that "When an act is to be done according to law, or a thing is to be established by law, we all understand that the law intended is a law passed by the legislature and not by some inferior body acting under powers conferred by the legislature."

I think in your brief, you didn't make a distinction between "fixed by" and "established by". So why not just apply this?



MR. PALADINO: Well, I don't agree that the legislature lacks the authority to delegate the authority that's been given to it. It was pursuant to law that these salaries were established.

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passed contemporaneously with that, there was some discussion about the legislature's power being checked by public opinion, because if they overcompensated themselves, the argument went, the public would vote them out. So doesn't sort of offloading these decisions to this committee circumvent that entire check on the legislature that was contemplated?

MR. PALADINO: No, Your Honor, because anyone who's paying attention realizes that it was the legislature and the governor, through the enactment of the 2018 law, that created this independent body and gave it the power to decide whether public officials should get a pay raise. So if the public doesn't like what the committee did, they realize that ultimate responsibility for those actions lies with the legislature and - - and the governor. They do not evade responsibility.

JUDGE WILSON: Let me see if I can follow up on Judge Garcia's concerns a little bit. In the typical case where we're delegating to an executive branch agency, what we're concerned about is the transfer, improper transfer,



of legislative power to the executive branch. With me so far?

MR. PALADINO: Um-hum.

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JUDGE WILSON: Okay. And we don't, in that circumstance, worry that the executive is being cut out of the process. We actually are worried that the executive is having too much power in the process, right? It's a balance that way.

If we're transferring to something that's an independent committee, that is not within the control of the executive, we're not worried about the executive having too much power in that balance, we're worried about the legislature abdicating some of its legislative responsibility, for example, my twenty-four-year-old daughter, who could have just as easily been named in the legislation as the people who are named there. She might actually do a good job on it, but that's another matter.

In thinking about how much we are willing to allow in the way of delegation, if at all, should we be looking for tighter restraints in the amount that is delegated - - - tighter controls around the delegation, if it is not to the executive branch, but it's rather to some sort of independent committee?

MR. PALADINO: That certainly sounds like, in theory, a valid concern. I think that those concerns would



be satisfied here by the level of detail in this statute. And in this case, I would also point out that the governor signed onto the process that created this body. It might be more problematic if, let's say, this legislation was created over gubernatorial veto.

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I would point out that, you know, what happened here at the supreme court is the - - - it was found that this independent body did go too far, and the judiciary stepped in, and that was an additional check by looking at the enabling legislation, looking at the guidelines, and concluding you didn't - - - you were not conferred authority to supersede provisions of the Public Law Officers Law.

But I appreciate Your Honor's concern, and I do acknowledge this isn't quite like the typical situation, but if you just substituted this committee for an administrative agency, let's say it was put in the executive branch and these things - - - these recommendations were just called regulations, and putting aside the SAPA process would have kicked in, I think here the statute intended to supersede the SAPA process.

Regulations are not submitted to the legislature for approval. They can, at any time, look at them and - - and over - - overrule them. So the fact that they're allowed to go into effect, isn't a problem, in that

respect.

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And I think that there are sufficient checks here, because the legislature could have always passed a new law and overridden the recommendations, just like they can, at any time, step in and overrule an administrative agency's rules and regulations.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: To go back to the overstepping of the delegation, you were asked a little while ago about the tiers. What is it in the enabling legislation that you view as authorizing, you know, this - - that goes beyond just setting a number. It actually changes the pay structure for those commissioners. Could that potentially have overstepped the delegation?

MR. PALADINO: No, Your Honor, because first, ask yourself, what was the purpose of the old tiers. The old tiers were in service of adequate compensation. There was a judgment that at that time, all of the commissioners in the six tiers performed relatively the same scope of duties and responsibilities, and therefore, they should get the same salary.

The committee found that that was outdated, that there had been shifts over time in the relative - - -  $\phantom{a}$ 

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: But that sounds like a quintessentially policy determination.

MR. PALADINO: I would disagree, Your Honor. I



1 think it's a subsidiary policy choice. The overarching 2 policy is adequate compensation. And the tiers were in 3 service of that. My opponent - - -4 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: So how many - - -5 MR. PALADINO: - - - has it backwards when he 6 says that I have to point to something that specifically 7 authorized the rearrangement of the tiers. The real 8 question is, is it in furtherance of the overarching 9 policy. And if the answer is yes, then the body was 10 allowed to make suc - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: Could they eliminate all the tiers 12 and say, you know, get rid of the tiers? 13 MR. PALADINO: Sure. They could have just gone -14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Could have done that? 16 17 18

MR. PALADINO: - - - commission by commissioner, and set adequate compensation. Imagine - - - like, in this case the only real shift was one commissioner got moved from old tier A to tier C. The - - - I think he was the head of the Gaming Commission. And one commissioner went from B, that was the Department of Financial Services, to tier A. That's because there had been shifts in the responsibilities over time.

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Under my opponent's view, if we were stuck with the old tiers, we would have had to have overpaid the



| 1  | gaming commissioner and underpaid the Commissioner of the   |
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| 2  | Department of Financial Services.                           |
| 3  | JUDGE GARCIA: Well, you could have changed the -            |
| 4  | you should could have changed the tiers by                  |
| 5  | actually enacting a law and having the governor sign it.    |
| 6  | MR. PALADINO: Because that                                  |
| 7  | JUDGE GARCIA: I mean, that's an option.                     |
| 8  | MR. PALADINO: there was a law that                          |
| 9  | authorized that, because the overarching policy is adequate |
| 10 | compensation, and I don't see what the tiers do other than  |
| 11 |   |
| 12 | JUDGE GARCIA: But they're changing the                      |
| 13 | MR. PALADINO: achieve adequate                              |
| 14 | compensation.   |
| 15 | JUDGE GARCIA: they're changing the tiers                    |
| 16 | much more than for those two commissioners. They're         |
| 17 | changing them into the future, right? I mean, they don't    |
| 18 | just apply the new tiers don't just apply to those          |
| 19 | two commissioners. They apply to anyone in the future,      |
| 20 | right? They've changed the law.                             |
| 21 | MR. PALADINO: Pursuant to authorization from the            |
| 22 | legislature, furthering the overarching policy of adequate  |
| 23 | compensation.   |
| 24 | JUDGE WILSON: I mean, there's two features about            |
| 25 | the tiers, right. And I took from one of your earlier       |

answers that you were saying, for example, let's take tier C, which is 120,000 - - - no, 140 to 160,000, I think. That if they had simply said, okay, all these people we've put in tier C, we're not going to say tier C; we're just going to list the names of these jobs and say, for each of those, it's 140 to 160,000 dollars. That - - you're not really - - - the tier is just a shorthand way of identifying commissioner by commissioner what the committee has decided is adequate compensation, right?

MR. PALADINO: Precisely.

JUDGE WILSON: That's the first part of what you said. There is a second part, though, to Mr. MacDonald's argument, which is that it should have said 140 or 150. It can't say 140 to 160, because that is then delegating the executive the power to pick the - - - fix the compensation.

MR. PALADINO: Well, that was what - - -

JUDGE WILSON: How do you respond to that piece of it?

MR. PALADINO: The committee was allowed to consider the need to attract talent. And I gave the example in my brief of, you want to hire your clerk. If you just have one salary you could pay, that would limit your sources. But if you have a range, you can hire either less experienced or more experienced. And it's similar here. If you give the appointed - - -



JUDGE WILSON: But then is that - - - how is that fixed by law, if it's not a number, even - - - if even the committee doesn't come up with a number?

MR. PALADINO: Well, Your Honor, the commissioners are not subject to a fixed-by-law requirement. The legislative - - - members of the legislature are, and the attorney general and the comptroller are - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Okay.

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MR. PALADINO: - - - one - - - under Article

XIII, Section 7, the other under Article III, Section 6,

these commissioners, they're - - - are not state officers

named in the Constitution. So you don't need to have them

precisely fixed. So that's my - - - the short answer to

that.

JUDGE WILSON: Yup.

MR. PALADINO: But again, I would just remind - what is the policy that these tiers represent, beyond
simply a shorthand way to achieve adequate compensation?
It's simply a subsidiary policy choice. And to have
required the committee to adhere to the old tiers would
have prevented the committee from fully achieving the
legislatively declared policy, because they would have had
to, you know, assume that these commissioners were doing
the same job they did twenty years ago when, in fact, over

time, some of their responsibilities have expanded and - - and some have contracted.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you, Mr. Paladino.

MR. PALADINO: Thank you, Your Honors.

JUDGE RIVERA: What, if anything, is your response to his last point, that the commissioners - - - with the respect to the tiers part of it? The commissioners are not even, let's call it this way, protected by the Constitutional provision saying fixed by law.

MR. MACDONALD: Certainly, so I agree that the commissioners don't need to be fixed by law. That's the starting point.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MR. MACDONALD: But there was a reason that the legislature originally did the six tiers of commissioners that the people supported through their votes for their legislators, and so on, and that meets the same equivalency in legislation passed by the legislature changing those six tiers, and especially because they had never before given the governor discretion to make hires. That's nowhere described in the 2018 law, to give the executive branch even more power and discretion. It may be a good idea. I think it is a good idea. But that's a policy determination

that's a good idea.

And on top of all that, I think there prob - - - there's - - - there's likely follow-on effects from all this. So you take tier six and move it up, and you move these - - - you make these progressions in the tiers of the pay of these commissioners. There's follow-on effects for the employees below them and the salaries that are expected to be paid to the people who are deputy commissioners and so on.

So that's a big question for the legislation to handle, not through some sort of vague thing to say, discover what's adequate and then decide whether or not anybody's warranted an increase based on what is your determination of adequate. And by the way, we're not going to give you any guiderails on this. We're going to list a bunch of factors that are nonexhaustive for you to go about your business.

And the committee, you know, sort of proved the point by going on its own merry way with its holistic view of legislature compensation, putting income restrictions on legislator pay, and deciding that legislators - - - legislatures are full-time employees, full-time.

JUDGE RIVERA: So let's say we agree with you.

Is then the only way the legislature and the governor could pursue this particular route that has interested them in



the past, and that they are arguing in support of now, is either to seek a Constitutional amendment or to pass a statute like you regularly pass a statute and allow for a gubernatorial veto, if that's the governor wants to do? Is that the only options or have I missed one?

MR. MACDONALD: You know, I don't know. I don't know if there's, like, some mechanism to be done where you pass a law that causes - - - you know, that is effectively a repealer and the replacement of some nature, where they can adequately do things with proper restrictions and turn it into an administrative - - I don't know. But - - - because that's not the question here. The - - - you know, the easy answer is pass a law. The other easy answer is, this is not the way it's done, this 2018 law. And maybe there's something in the middle.

JUDGE RIVERA: When you say, pass a law, as in pass a statute, you mean they could either have made the decisions themselves - - -

MR. MACDONALD: Correct.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - or set this framework up, but they're just recommendations, and then they would take those recommendations and do whatever they need to do to have it pass as a statute, allowing for a gubernatorial veto.

MR. MACDONALD: Right.



JUDGE RIVERA: Am I understanding that?

MR. MACDONALD: Yes, that's correct.

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And so there was not actually a SAPA claim - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: The governor vetoing what the legislators get paid.

MR. MACDONALD: Right. There was not actually a SAPA claim in this. SAPA a question asked to illustrate that nobody can identify what it was that this group did, because it wasn't rule-making, but it - - - because it was law-making.

Just to quickly address a point from earlier, the Berger Commission to clarify. That commission was undoing certificates of need that were already part of the Health Act. So the Health commissioner had - - health - - - health commission or the public health council, whatever, had issued certificates of need to all these facilities. The Berger Commissioning was looking at reducing the volume of services and so on, within the existing statutory framework. So it was going to eliminate certificates of need.

There's no argument here with the current body of law on delegation doctrine and whether it's been too broad in some interest, where it's just the public interest or something like that, because we don't get there with this case. We don't get there with this case because this group

made new laws that superseded old laws, and it had no bounds on it anyhow, even if it could be considered part of that delegation. There was nothing constraining it, and it - - - by its own actions, it illustrated how nothing was constraining it. ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you, Mr. MacDonald. (Court is adjourned) 



| 1  |   | CERTIFICATION          |
|----|---|------------------------|
| 2  |   |                        |
| 3  | I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing           |                        |
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